Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135065
 


 



Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences


Keith N. Hylton


William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law

August 23, 2012

Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-41

Abstract:     
Since China has modeled its antitrust regime on that of the EU, there are essentially two antitrust regime types: the U.S. and the EU. This chapter is a brief comparative study of the two regimes. I focus on three categories in which fundamental differences are observed: enforcement, legal standards, and procedure. Within each of the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. With respect to enforcement, the EU imposes gain-based penalties while the U.S. imposes harm-based penalties. In predation law, the U.S. has a marginal cost standard and the EU has an average cost standard. With respect to procedure, the U.S. is a common law system, while the EU’s procedure is closer to the civil law system in its allocation of power between the courts and the enforcement agency. These differences have profound implications for the welfare consequences of global antitrust enforcement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: antitrust enforcement, international competition law, comparative antitrust law, antitrust economics

JEL Classification: L40, L49

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Date posted: August 23, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences (August 23, 2012). Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-41. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2135065

Contact Information

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)
William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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