Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135966
 


 



Bertrand Versus Cournot Competition in a Vertical Structure: A Note


Arijit Mukherjee


University of York (UK)

Udo Broll


Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

Soma Mukherjee


University of Nottingham

September 2012

The Manchester School, Vol. 80, Issue 5, pp. 545-559, 2012

Abstract:     
In a vertical structure with a profit‐maximizing upstream firm, we show that whether the profits in the downstream market are higher under Bertrand competition or under Cournot competition depends on the technology differences among the downstream firms and on the pricing strategy (namely uniform pricing or price discrimination) of the upstream firm. The upstream firm's profit, the profit of the upstream and the downstream firms taken together, and social welfare are always higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: August 25, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Mukherjee, Arijit and Broll, Udo and Mukherjee, Soma, Bertrand Versus Cournot Competition in a Vertical Structure: A Note (September 2012). The Manchester School, Vol. 80, Issue 5, pp. 545-559, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2135966 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02228.x

Contact Information

Arijit Mukherjee (Contact Author)
University of York (UK) ( email )
Heslington, York YO10 5DD
United Kingdom
Udo Broll
Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )
Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany
Soma Mukherjee
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom
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