Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136179
 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Games on Networks


Matthew O. Jackson


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Santa Fe Institute; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)

Yves Zenou


Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 1, 2014

Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, eds., Elsevier Science, July 2014

Abstract:     
We provide an overview and synthesis of the literatures analyzing games in which players are connected via a network structure. We discuss, in particular, the impact of the structure of the network on individuals' behaviors. We focus on game theoretic modeling, but also include some discussion of analyses of peer effects, as well as applications to diffusion, employment, crime, industrial organization, and education.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 89

Keywords: network games, social networks, games on networks, graphical games, games with incomplete information, peer effects

JEL Classification: D85, C72, A14

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: August 26, 2012 ; Last revised: July 18, 2014

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Matthew O. and Zenou, Yves, Games on Networks (January 1, 2014). Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 4, Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, eds., Elsevier Science, July 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136179

Contact Information

Matthew O. Jackson (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
1-650-723-3544 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm
Santa Fe Institute
1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) ( email )
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Yves Zenou
Stockholm University ( email )
Stockholm, SE-106 91
Sweden
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )
P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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