The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council
University of Heidelberg
University of Westminster
Matthew D. Rablen
Brunel University London - Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications
James Raymond Vreeland
Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Government
July 31, 2012
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3902
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections
JEL Classification: F530, F550, O190
Date posted: August 29, 2012
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.266 seconds