Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137541
 
 

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The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council


Axel Dreher


University of Heidelberg

Matthew Gould


University of Westminster

Matthew D. Rablen


Brunel University - School of Social Sciences

James Raymond Vreeland


Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Government

July 31, 2012

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3902

Abstract:     
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, turn-taking norm, elections

JEL Classification: F530, F550, O190

working papers series


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Date posted: August 29, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Dreher, Axel and Gould, Matthew and Rablen, Matthew D. and Vreeland, James Raymond, The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council (July 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3902. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137541

Contact Information

Axel Dreher (Contact Author)
University of Heidelberg ( email )
Grabengasse 1
Heidelberg, 69117
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.axel-dreher.de
Matthew Gould
University of Westminster ( email )
309 Regent Street
London, W1R 8AL
United Kingdom
Matthew D. Rablen
Brunel University - School of Social Sciences ( email )
Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH
United Kingdom
James Raymond Vreeland
Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-7846 (Phone)
202-687-5116 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com/
Georgetown University - Department of Government
United States
202-687-7846 (Phone)
202-687-5116 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.profvreeland.com/
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