Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138248
 


 



Regulatory Competition and Anticorruption Law


Paul B. Stephan III


University of Virginia School of Law

August 2012

Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 2012, Forthcoming
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2012-09

Abstract:     
This article considers whether the prospect of increased competition in the regulation of international bribery is desirable or not. It explores the factors that can determine whether this competition will augment or diminish global welfare. Its conclusion is optimistic. Based on what we know about the general dynamics of regulatory competition, the risk that multiple anticorruption regimes will lead to confusion, obstruction of valuable transactions, or a kind of arms race among states seeking to protect national champions is low. Conversely, the likelihood that multiple, often overlapping regimes will decrease the incidence of welfare-diminishing corruption is high. The article initially was presented at a conference organized by the Virginia Journal of International Law and the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: regulatory competition, bribery, corruption, antitrust

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Date posted: August 29, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Stephan, Paul B., Regulatory Competition and Anticorruption Law (August 2012). Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 2012, Forthcoming; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2012-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138248

Contact Information

Paul B. Stephan III (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7098 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

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