Regulatory Competition and Anticorruption Law
Paul B. Stephan III
University of Virginia School of Law
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 2012, Forthcoming
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2012-09
This article considers whether the prospect of increased competition in the regulation of international bribery is desirable or not. It explores the factors that can determine whether this competition will augment or diminish global welfare. Its conclusion is optimistic. Based on what we know about the general dynamics of regulatory competition, the risk that multiple anticorruption regimes will lead to confusion, obstruction of valuable transactions, or a kind of arms race among states seeking to protect national champions is low. Conversely, the likelihood that multiple, often overlapping regimes will decrease the incidence of welfare-diminishing corruption is high. The article initially was presented at a conference organized by the Virginia Journal of International Law and the John Bassett Moore Society of International Law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: regulatory competition, bribery, corruption, antitrustAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 29, 2012
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