Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138901
 


 



CDS Zombies


Anna Gelpern


Georgetown University Law Center

G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

August 29, 2012

European Business Organization Law Review 13, Forthcoming
American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-37

Abstract:     
This paper examines the contract interpretation strategies adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for its credit derivatives contracts in the Greek sovereign debt crisis. We argue that the economic function of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) after Greece is limited and uncertain, partly thanks to ISDA’s insistence on textualist interpretation. Contract theory explanations for textualist preferences emphasise either transactional efficiency or relational factors, which do not fit ISDA or the derivatives market. We pose an alternative explanation: the embrace of textualism in this case may be a means for ISDA to reconcile the competing political demands from state regulators and its market constituents. We describe categories of contracts susceptible to such political demands, and consider when and why textualism might be the preferred response.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: CDS, derivatives, sovereign debt, Greece, Europe, financial crisis, ISDA

JEL Classification: F34, F36, G15, G28, G38, K12, K23

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: September 3, 2012 ; Last revised: October 15, 2012

Suggested Citation

Gelpern, Anna and Gulati, G. Mitu, CDS Zombies (August 29, 2012). European Business Organization Law Review 13, Forthcoming; American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2012-37. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2138901

Contact Information

Anna Gelpern (Contact Author)
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
Gaurang Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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