Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139787
 


 



Are Sequential Trials Really Better than Unitary Trials?


Jef P. B. De Mot


Ghent University

Barbara Luppi


Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

August 31, 2012

U of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-23
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-38

Abstract:     
In a dispute involving multifarious points of disagreement, courts have the discretion to adjudicate issues separately in multiple, sequential proceedings or all-at-once in a single unitary proceeding. In this paper, we contrast the effects of sequential and unitary trials on parties’ decisions to litigate and parties’ expenditures in litigation, using a rent-seeking model. Contrary to the prior literature on this topic, we find that neither procedural regime is outright superior to the other and that the optimal choice of procedural regime is contingent on factors particular to each case. Furthermore, we identify which conditions cause one procedural regime to be more efficient than the other, and suggest policies to take advantage of these differences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: rent-seeking, litigation expenditures, sequential litigation

JEL Classification: B31, D72, K10, K12, K13, K41

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 2, 2012  

Suggested Citation

De Mot, Jef P. B. and Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Are Sequential Trials Really Better than Unitary Trials? (August 31, 2012). U of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-23; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-38. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2139787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2139787

Contact Information

Jef P. B. De Mot
Ghent University ( email )
Universiteitsstraat 4
Ghent, 9000
Belgium
Barbara Luppi (Contact Author)
Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )
Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy
University of St. Thomas School of Law
MN
United States
Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 378
Downloads: 63
Download Rank: 199,889
People who downloaded this paper also downloaded:
1. Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law
By Daniel Pi, Francesco Parisi, ...

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 1.047 seconds