Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141247
 


 



A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth


Donald G. Gifford


University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

William L. Reynolds II


University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

Andrew M. Murad


University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Arent Fox LLP

August 30, 2012

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, 2013
U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-49

Abstract:     
This Article uses the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth to examine the textualist or “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation. For more than a quarter-century, Justice Scalia has successfully promoted textualism, usually associated with conservatism, among his colleagues. In Bruesewitz, Scalia, writing for the majority, and his liberal colleague Justice Sotomayer, in dissent, both employed textualism to determine if the plaintiffs, whose child was allegedly harmed by a vaccine, could pursue common-law tort claims or whether their remedies were limited to those available under the no-fault compensation system established by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Despite these Justices’ common approach to statutory interpretation, they reached diametrically opposite conclusions in opinions that dissected the statutory language and quarreled over the meaning of “even though” and “if” clauses. In contrast, Justice Breyer employed a purposive or “purposes and objectives” approach to statutory interpretation. Rather than obsessing over the meaning of each and every phrase, Breyer looked at Congress’s goals in passing the Act. He recognized that Scalia’s conclusion was correct, not because of the supposedly “plain” meaning of specific language, but because this interpretation was the only one that enabled the alternative compensation system to function as Congress envisioned. Other scholars have analyzed Bruesewitz as a preemption case, but despite statutory interpretation’s inherently decisive role in express preemption cases, this is the first Article to highlight Bruesewitz as an illustration of the emptiness of textualism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: statutory interpretation, textualism, plain meaning rule, purposive approach, purposes and objectives, no-fault compensation, federal preemption, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer, Legal Process School

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 4, 2012 ; Last revised: April 13, 2013

Suggested Citation

Gifford, Donald G. and Reynolds, William L. and Murad, Andrew M., A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth (August 30, 2012). South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, 2013; U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-49. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141247

Contact Information

Donald G. Gifford (Contact Author)
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States
William L. Reynolds II
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States
Andrew M. Murad
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law ( email )
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201-1786
United States
Arent Fox LLP ( email )
Washington, DC
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 840
Downloads: 94
Download Rank: 165,122

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.281 seconds