Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144376
 


 



The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury


Jason M. Solomon


Stanford Law School

2012

Emory Law Journal, Vol. 61, 2012
William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-224

Abstract:     
At the root of many contemporary debates over the civil justice or tort system — debates over punitive damages, preemption, and tort reform more broadly — are underlying questions about the justification for the civil jury. The United States is the only country that still uses a jury in civil cases, and most civil jury trials are tort trials. The jury has more power to decide questions of law in tort than in any other area of law, so any serious discussion of tort law must have the civil jury at its center.

The debate over the jury — in both the academic literature and the public domain — tends to focus on how good or bad it is as an adjudicative institution. But its justification has often been based on its value as a political institution.

In this Article, I look at the theory, concepts, and empirical evidence behind four principal justifications for the civil jury as a political institution: (1) acting as a check on government and corporate power, (2) injecting community norms into the legal system, (3) providing legitimacy for the civil justice system, and (4) fostering political and civic engagement among citizens.

I tentatively conclude that the benefits of the civil jury as a political institution are overstated and provide suggestions for improving the functioning of the jury as a political institution and for further empirical research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: civil jury, tort law

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Date posted: September 10, 2012 ; Last revised: September 11, 2012

Suggested Citation

Solomon, Jason M., The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury (2012). Emory Law Journal, Vol. 61, 2012; William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-224. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144376

Contact Information

Jason M. Solomon (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-736-6080 (Phone)
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