Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144419
 


 



Narcissism is a Bad Sign: CEO Signature Size, Investment, and Performance


Charles (Chad) Ham


University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

Nicholas Seybert


University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance

Sean Wang


University of North Carolina - Kenan-Flagler Business School

June 1, 2014

UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper No. 2013-1

Abstract:     
Using the size of CEO signatures in annual SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that it predicts an array of negative outcomes. CEO narcissism predicts overinvestment, yet fewer patents and lower patent citation frequency. Investment by narcissists negatively predicts future sales and sales growth, and narcissists also deliver lower ROA, especially for firms in uncertain operating environments. Despite this negative performance, narcissistic CEOs enjoy higher compensation. Consistent with some firms realizing the dangers of narcissism, narcissists are more likely to be hired by mature, low-growth firms. In addition, narcissistic CEOs have shorter tenures, suggesting potential negative career consequences.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: narcissism, CEO, investment, performance, return on assets, stock price, compensation, manipulation, psychology

JEL Classification: M10, M40, G30

working papers series





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Date posted: September 10, 2012 ; Last revised: July 21, 2014

Suggested Citation

Ham, Charles (Chad) and Seybert, Nicholas and Wang, Sean, Narcissism is a Bad Sign: CEO Signature Size, Investment, and Performance (June 1, 2014). UNC Kenan-Flagler Research Paper No. 2013-1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144419 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144419

Contact Information

Charles Ham
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States
Nicholas Seybert (Contact Author)
University of Maryland - Department of Accounting & Information Assurance ( email )
Robert H. Smith School of Business
College Park, MD 20742-9157
United States
Sean Wang
University of North Carolina - Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )
McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

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