Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144932
 
 

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The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy


Jeromin Zettelmeyer


European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; CEPR; Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Christoph Trebesch


Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

August 1, 2013

Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 2013-13-8

Abstract:     
The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief – over 50 per cent of 2012 GDP – with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents – particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors – that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

Keywords: sovereign debt, sovereign default, debt restructuring, financial crises, Eurozone crisis, Greece

JEL Classification: F34

working papers series





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Date posted: September 11, 2012 ; Last revised: August 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Zettelmeyer, Jeromin and Trebesch, Christoph and Gulati, G. Mitu, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy (August 1, 2013). Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 2013-13-8. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144932 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144932

Contact Information

Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Contact Author)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( email )
One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2JN
United Kingdom
+442073386178 (Phone)
+442073386110 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/researchers.shtml#jeromin
CEPR ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Christoph Trebesch
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )
Schackstr. 4
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/christophtrebesch/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Gaurang Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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