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Trusting And Non-Trusting: Comparing Benefits, Cost And Risk

Tamar Frankel
Boston University School of Law


1999

Boston University School of Law Working Paper 99-12

Abstract:     
The Article deals with trusting (reasonable belief in facts and promises) focusing mainly on business and finance relationships. A simple and familiar method is used for evaluating net benefits from trusting, by listing benefits (reduced verification and monitoring costs), cost (establishing relationships, lost opportunities) and risk of trusting relationships, covering both individuals and systems. The article outlines the strategies for reducing the costs and risks from trusting (markets and self-protections mechanisms), highlighting the cost and risk reduction by impersonal trusting in institutions (financial intermediaries and the financial system). Such impersonal trusting, however, must be strongly backed by law and law enforcement, and shape market norms. The Article expresses great concern at recent legal literature that preaches contract as the overall legal model subsuming fiduciary law, intercorporate relationships, and relationship to investors in business trusts and clients of other money managers. The Article compares the contract model (individualism, self-protection, minimal government interference and "on your guard" attitude of non-trusting) to fiduciary and statutory regulation models (dependence, reliance and greater trusting). The article suggests that in the current environment, where trusting in the financial system and emerging electronic commerce is crucial, the time has come to put contract where it should belong and balance it well against a trusting legal models.

JEL Classifications: K0

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 14, 2000 ; Last revised: April 25, 2000

Contact Information

Tamar Frankel (Contact Author)
Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
1070G
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-3773 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)
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