Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism?

Davis, Kevin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2148082

Abstract

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Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism?

Kevin E. Davis

New York University School of Law

July 1, 2012

NYU Annual Survey of American Law, Vol. 67, No. 3, 2012
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-51

Abstract:
This short essay traces the legislative history of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its amendments to examine the influence of three distinct motivations: moralism, (economic) self-interest and altruism. The legislative history suggests that moralism and self-interest played the most significant roles in influencing the provisions of the original Act and its 1988 Amendments. Since then altruism has played a more prominent role in shaping the FCPA and other initiatives aimed at foreign bribery. The essay concludes by discussing the potential tension between self-interest and altruism and ways in which it might be resolved.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FCPA, bribery

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Date posted: September 18, 2012 ; Last revised: September 22, 2012

Suggested Citation

Davis, Kevin E., Why Does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism? (July 1, 2012). NYU Annual Survey of American Law, Vol. 67, No. 3, 2012; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-51. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148082

Contact Information

Kevin E. Davis (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Vanderbilt Hall, Room 335
New York, NY 10012-1099
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212-992-8843 (Phone)