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The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's Hanging
David A. Anderson Centre College March 2000 Abstract: The tenet that harsher penalties could substantially reduce crime rates rests on the assumption that currently active criminals weigh the costs and benefits of their contemplated acts. Existing and proposed crime strategies exhibit this belief, as does a large and growing segment of the crime literature. Using a new approach, this study examines the premise that criminals make informed and rational decisions, presents findings on the influences affecting criminals, and discusses crime prevention strategies that respond to the apparent roots of criminal behavior. The results suggest that 76 percent of active criminals and 89 percent of the most violent criminals either perceive no risk of apprehension or have no thought about the likely punishments for their crimes. Still more criminals are undeterred by harsher punishments because drugs, psychosis, ego, revenge, or fight-or-flight impulses inhibit the desired responses to traditional prevention methods.
JEL Classifications: K14 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: April 18, 2000 ; Last revised: May 17, 2000Suggested CitationContact Information
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