Abstract

  


 



Markets Can Cure Spam Zombies


Marshall W. Van Alstyne


Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems; MIT Sloan School

Sarah Zatko


Boston University - Department of Computer Science
September 2009


Abstract:     
Using attention bonds to create attention markets has been proposed as a solution to the spam problem. One critique leveled at this approach is that criminals might then try to seize the bonds and not just CPU cycles. We propose a simple solution based on insurance and two sided networks in order to show that markets can address this critique.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 2

Keywords: spam, zombies, attention bonds, Coase, two sided markets, insurance

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D23, D6, D82, H21, O30

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Date posted: September 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Van Alstyne, Marshall W. and Zatko, Sarah, Markets Can Cure Spam Zombies (September 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148741

Contact Information

Marshall W. Van Alstyne (Contact Author)
Boston University - Department of Management Information Systems ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-358-3571 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://smgapps.bu.edu/mgmt_new/profiles/VanAlstyneMarshall.html
MIT Sloan School ( email )
Center for Digital Business
5 Cambridge Center - NE25, 7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0768 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/home.html
Sarah Zatko
Boston University - Department of Computer Science ( email )
Boston, MA
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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