Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153378
 


 



Social Media and Corruption


Ruben Enikolopov


Institute for Political Economy and Governance; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School

Maria Petrova


New Economic School (NES); Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Konstantin Sonin


Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

November 2013


Abstract:     
In democratic countries, traditional mass media provide an important mechanism of fostering accountability. Do new media such as blogs play a similar role in authoritarian countries with suppressed offline media? We study consequences of blog posts about corruption in Russian state-controlled companies. We identify negative impact of blog posts on stock returns of these companies, using five-minute, daily, or monthly data. We use incidents of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on other blogs to confirm that the results are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity. We show that blog posts increase corporate accountability as evidenced by higher management turnover and less corporate conflicts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: political economy, blogs, Russia, Alexei Navalny, corruption

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Date posted: September 27, 2012 ; Last revised: November 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Enikolopov, Ruben and Petrova, Maria and Sonin, Konstantin, Social Media and Corruption (November 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153378

Contact Information

Ruben Enikolopov
Institute for Political Economy and Governance ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Maria Petrova (Contact Author)
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
Konstantin Sonin
Higher School of Economics ( email )
20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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