Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153378
 


 



Social Media and Corruption


Ruben Enikolopov


Institute of Political Economy and Governance; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; New Economic School; Barcelona GSE

Maria Petrova


Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE); New Economic School (NES)

Konstantin Sonin


Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

May 26, 2015


Abstract:     
Can publications in social media affect people’s behavior and promote accountability? We show that anti-corruption blog posts by Aleksei Navalny, a popular Russian civic activist, had a negative causal impact on market returns of state-controlled companies. For identification, we exploit the analysis of the precise timing of blog posts combined with quasirandom variation in access to blog platform caused by hacker attacks. The effect becomes less pronounced and even positive for the posts that attract the most attention, consistent with disciplining effect of social media. Finally, the posts have a long-term impact on returns and are associated with higher management turnover and less minority shareholder conflicts. Taken together, our results provide suggestive evidence that social media can discipline corruption even in a country with limited political competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: political economy, financial markets, social media, governance


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Date posted: September 27, 2012 ; Last revised: May 27, 2015

Suggested Citation

Enikolopov, Ruben and Petrova, Maria and Sonin, Konstantin, Social Media and Corruption (May 26, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2153378

Contact Information

Ruben Enikolopov
Institute of Political Economy and Governance ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
ICREA ( email )
Passeig Lluís Companys, 23
Barcelona, 08010
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
New Economic School ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Barcelona GSE ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
Maria Petrova (Contact Author)
Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Barcelona ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, E-08005
Spain
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
New Economic School (NES) ( email )
47 Nakhimovsky Prospekt
Moscow, 117418
Russia
Konstantin Sonin
Higher School of Economics ( email )
20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN


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