Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153979
 
 

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Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System (U.S. Supreme Court)


Bernard S. Black


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

David Dranove


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Cory S. Capps


Bates White, LLC

Martin S. Gaynor


Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation

Robert J. Town


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Timothy Bresnahan


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David M. Cutler


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Guy David


University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department

Alain C. Enthoven


Stanford University - Knight Management Center

Gautam Gowrisankaran


University of Arizona - Eller College of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Deborah Haas-Wilson


Smith College

Katherine Ho


Columbia University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Richard Lindrooth


University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus

Anthony T. Lo Sasso


University of Illinois at Chicago - School of Public Health

Thomas G. McGuire


Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy

Aviv Nevo


Northwestern University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Stephen L. Parente


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Mark V. Pauly


University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tomas Philipson


University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Uwe Reinhardt


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Mark Satterthwaite


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

R. Lawrence Van Horn


Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

William White


Cornell University

Dennis Yao


Harvard Business School; University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department

Jack Zwanziger


University of Illinois at Chicago

August 20, 2012

Health Management, Policy and Innovation, Vol. 1 (2012)

Abstract:     
This amicus brief was filed in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., in which the FTC has obtained review of an 11th Circuit decision that insulated a merger of two nonprofit hospitals from antitrust scrutiny. We make two arguments in the amicus brief. First, there is no compelling theoretical basis for an antitrust exemption for nonprofit hospitals. That is, economic theory provides no determinate conclusions regarding whether nonprofits will exploit market power if given the opportunity. As a consequence, whether there is an economic basis for more favorable treatment of nonprofit hospitals is an empirical matter. Second, there is a strong consensus in empirical research that, in general, nonprofit hospitals do exploit their market power by raising prices. This empirical evidence on the exercise of market power by nonprofit hospitals strongly suggests that they should not be exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Such an exemption would serve the private interests of nonprofit hospitals to the detriment of consumers and society as a whole.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

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Date posted: October 19, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Black, Bernard S. and Dranove, David and Capps, Cory S. and Gaynor, Martin S. and Town, Robert J. and Bresnahan, Timothy and Cutler, David M. and David, Guy and Enthoven, Alain C. and Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Haas-Wilson, Deborah and Ho, Katherine and Lindrooth, Richard and Lo Sasso, Anthony T. and McGuire, Thomas G. and Nevo, Aviv and Parente, Stephen L. and Pauly, Mark V. and Philipson, Tomas and Reinhardt, Uwe and Satterthwaite, Mark and Van Horn, R. Lawrence and White, William and Yao, Dennis and Zwanziger, Jack, Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System (U.S. Supreme Court) (August 20, 2012). Health Management, Policy and Innovation, Vol. 1 (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2153979

Contact Information

Bernard S. Black (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
512-503-2784 (Phone)

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-5049 (Phone)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Brussels
Belgium
David Dranove
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8682 (Phone)
847-467-1777 (Fax)
Cory S. Capps
Bates White, LLC ( email )
2001 K St., NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20006
United States
202.216.1151 (Phone)
202.408.7838 (Fax)
Martin S. Gaynor
Carnegie Mellon University ( email )
H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy
and Management
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-7933 (Phone)
412-268-5338 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation
12 Priory Road
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
Robert J. Town
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Timothy F. Bresnahan
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-725-5702 (Fax)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
David M. Cutler
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center, Room 315A
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-5216 (Phone)
617-495-8570 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-868-3900 (Phone)
617-868-2742 (Fax)
Guy David
University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Colonial Penn Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6358
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/david.html

Alain C. Enthoven
Stanford University - Knight Management Center ( email )
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-7298
United States
Gautam Gowrisankaran
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
HOME PAGE: http://econ.arizona.edu/faculty/gowrisankaran.asp
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Deborah Haas-Wilson
Smith College ( email )
Department of Economics
Northampton, MA 01060
United States
413-585-3636 (Phone)
413-585-3635 (Fax)
Katherine Ho
Columbia University - Department of Economics ( email )
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Richard Lindrooth
University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus ( email )
1, L15-1503 12631 E. 17th Avenue
Aurora, CO 80045
United States
Anthony T. Lo Sasso
University of Illinois at Chicago - School of Public Health ( email )
Chicago, IL 60612
United States
Thomas G. McGuire
Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy ( email )
25 Shattuck Street
Boston, MA 02115
United States
Aviv Nevo
Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )
2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stephen L. Parente
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )
410 David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory
Urbana, IL 61801
United States
Mark V. Pauly
University of Pennsylvania - Health Care Systems Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
208 Colonial Penn Center
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6358
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Tomas J. Philipson
University of Chicago ( email )
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, 60637
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Uwe Reinhardt
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
R. Lawrence Van Horn
Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )
Nashville, TN 37203
United States

William White
Cornell University ( email )
120 Martha Van Rensselaer Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
Dennis Yao
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department ( email )
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States
215-898-3019 (Phone)
Jack Zwanziger
University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )
Chicago, IL 60612
United States
Feedback to SSRN


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