Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154022
 
 

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A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments


Emmanuel Dechenaux


Kent State University - Department of Economics

Dan Kovenock


Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Roman M. Sheremeta


Case Western Reserve University; Case Western Reserve University

September 28, 2012


Abstract:     
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 96

Keywords: contests, all-pay auctions, tournaments, experiments

JEL Classification: C7, C9, D7, H4, J4, J7, K4, L2, M5

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Date posted: September 29, 2012 ; Last revised: December 17, 2012

Suggested Citation

Dechenaux, Emmanuel and Kovenock, Dan and Sheremeta, Roman M., A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments (September 28, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154022

Contact Information

Emmanuel Dechenaux
Kent State University - Department of Economics ( email )
Kent, OH 44242
United States
Daniel J Kovenock
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )
One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)
Case Western Reserve University ( email )
10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
Case Western Reserve University ( email )
Cleveland, CA 44106
United States
(216) 368-4271 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
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