Citations (8)



Active Ownership

Elroy Dimson

London Business School; University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Oğuzhan Karakaş

Boston College - Department of Finance

Xi Li

Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

August 7, 2015

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

We analyze an extensive proprietary database of corporate social responsibility engagements with U.S. public companies from 1999-2009. Engagements address environmental, social, and governance concerns. Successful (unsuccessful) engagements are followed by positive (zero) abnormal returns. Companies with inferior governance and socially conscious institutional investors are more likely to be engaged. Success in engagements is more probable if the engaged firm has reputational concerns and higher capacity to implement changes. Collaboration among activists is instrumental in increasing the success rate of environmental/social engagements. After successful engagements, particularly on environmental/social issues, companies experience improved accounting performance and governance and increased institutional ownership.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Engagement, corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental, social, and governance (ESG), socially responsible investing (SRI), universal ownership, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: G15, G23, G34

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Date posted: October 1, 2012 ; Last revised: August 8, 2015

Suggested Citation

Dimson, Elroy and Karakaş, Oğuzhan and Li, Xi, Active Ownership (August 7, 2015). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154724

Contact Information

Elroy Dimson (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
44 20 7000 7000 (Phone)
44 700 607 7390 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.london.edu/faculty/edimson
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
Oğuzhan Karakaş
Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )
Carroll School of Management
Fulton Hall 334, 140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
+1-617-552-1175 (Phone)
+1-617-552-0431 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~karakas/
Xi Li
Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )
Alter Hall 449
1801 Liacouras Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://astro.temple.edu/~xili/

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