Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154724
 
 

Citations (5)



 


 



Active Ownership


Elroy Dimson


London Business School; University of Cambridge - Judge Business School

Oğuzhan Karakaş


Boston College - Department of Finance

Xi Li


Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ; Temple University - Department of Accounting

June 4, 2013


Abstract:     
We analyze an extensive proprietary database of corporate social responsibility engagements with US public companies over 1999–2009. Engagements address environmental, social, and governance concerns. They are followed by a one-year abnormal return that averages 1.8%, comprising 4.4% for successful and zero for unsuccessful engagements. We document outperformance following environmental/social, as well as governance, engagements. Firms are more likely to be engaged, and engagements are more likely to be successful, if the target firm is concerned about its reputation and if it has higher capacity to implement corporate social responsibility changes. After successful engagements, companies experience improvements in operating performance, profitability, efficiency, and governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Engagement, corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental, social, and governance (ESG), socially responsible investing (SRI), universal ownership, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: G15, G23, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: October 1, 2012 ; Last revised: April 21, 2014

Suggested Citation

Dimson, Elroy and Karakaş, Oğuzhan and Li, Xi, Active Ownership (June 4, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154724

Contact Information

Elroy Dimson (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
44 20 7000 7000 (Phone)
44 700 607 7390 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.london.edu/faculty/edimson
University of Cambridge - Judge Business School
Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
Oğuzhan Karakaş
Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )
Carroll School of Management
Fulton Hall 334, 140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
+1-617-552-1175 (Phone)
+1-617-552-0431 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~karakas/
Xi Li
Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )
1801 Liacouras Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://astro.temple.edu/~xili/

Temple University - Department of Accounting ( email )
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://astro.temple.edu/~xili/

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