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Quels Remèdes pour les Abus de Position Dominante ? Une Analyse Economique des Décisions de la Commission Européenne (What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions)Patrice BougetteUniversity of Nice-Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG); LAMETA CNRS Frédéric M. MartyResearch Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) September 2012 Concurrences, 3-2012, pp. 30-45 Abstract: Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.
Note: Downloadable document is in French. Number of Pages in PDF File: 19 Keywords: Remedies, Abuse of dominant position, Unilateral practices, European Commission JEL Classification: L40, K20 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 3, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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