Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154966
 


 



Quels Remèdes pour les Abus de Position Dominante ? Une Analyse Economique des Décisions de la Commission Européenne (What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions)


Patrice Bougette


University of Nice Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)

Frédéric M. Marty


Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG)

September 2012

Concurrences, 3-2012, pp. 30-45

Abstract:     
Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Remedies, Abuse of dominant position, Unilateral practices, European Commission

JEL Classification: L40, K20

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: October 3, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Bougette, Patrice and Marty, Frédéric M., Quels Remèdes pour les Abus de Position Dominante ? Une Analyse Economique des Décisions de la Commission Européenne (What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions) (September 2012). Concurrences, 3-2012, pp. 30-45. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154966

Contact Information

Patrice Bougette (Contact Author)
University of Nice Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) ( email )
250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France
HOME PAGE: http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr
Frédéric M. Marty
Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) ( email )
250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France
HOME PAGE: http://hp.gredeg.cnrs.fr/marty/
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