A Clash of Regulatory Paradigms
Christopher S. Yoo
University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science
October 1, 2012
Regulation, p. 42, Fall 2012
The decision whether to mandate access to telecommunications networks presents policymakers with a choice between two regulatory paradigms. One focuses on breaking down the traditional monopoly by stimulating competitive entry; the other surrenders to the monopoly and simply seeks to allocate the monopoly facility. The theoretical and empirical literature both suggest that whenever competition is feasible, policymakers should generally follow the first course by refusing to mandate access. Moreover, when competition is feasible but not yet present, policymakers should mandate access only if the short-run static efficiency losses from monopoly dominate the long-run dynamic efficiency gains.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 8Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 1, 2012
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