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Competing Risks & Deposit Insurance Governance Convergence

Christopher Gandrud

Hertie School of Governance

October 2, 2012

International Political Science Review, 2014

Why do policies often seem to converge across countries at the same time? This question has been studied extensively in the diffusion literature. However, past research has not examined complex choice environments, especially where there are many alternatives. My paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. I show how Fine and Gray Competing Risks Event History Analysis can be used to tease apart the causes of policy convergence. I apply the method to an examination of the reasons why, from the mid-1990s to 2007, many countries created independent deposit insurers. I find an interaction between international recommendations and regional peers’ choices, particularly in the European Union. However, convergence appears to slow under the particular conditions of a banking crisis, regardless of how well independence was promoted. Possibly due to electoral incentives democracies seem to have been more likely to create independent insurers. Ultimately, I demonstrate how competing risks analysis can help enable future research on policy choices, complementing methods previously applied in political economy.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

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Date posted: October 3, 2012 ; Last revised: June 16, 2014

Suggested Citation

Gandrud, Christopher, Competing Risks & Deposit Insurance Governance Convergence (October 2, 2012). International Political Science Review, 2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2155986

Contact Information

Christopher Gandrud (Contact Author)
Hertie School of Governance ( email )
Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
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