Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157079
 


 



Invisible Lawmaking


Barak Orbach


University of Arizona

October 3, 2012

79 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2012)
Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-32

Abstract:     
Private lawmaking is an ordinary rent-seeking activity of interest groups: the pursuit of self-interest through regulation. Familiar examples of private lawmakers include the National Rifle Association (NRA), the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and the National Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Motivated private lawmakers take advantage of imperfections in the marketplace of ideas and utilize such imperfections to obscure their visibility. The U.S. Supreme Court’s “marketplace of ideas” theory denies market imperfections and presumes prefect competition in the marketplace. This presumption rests on the Court’s firm premise that the pursuit of self-interest necessarily serves the public. Resting on this unqualified confidence in the pursuit in self-interest, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court has empowered interest groups, strengthening their influence over public lawmakers. This Essay presents how the Supreme Court’s confidence in the inherent value of the pursuit of self-interest has weakened democratic institutions, arming interest groups with effective means to draft the law of the land, while circumventing the public discourse and shortcutting open debates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Private Lawmaking, Rent Seeking, Citizens United, Marketplace of Ideas, Regulation

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Date posted: October 4, 2012 ; Last revised: January 8, 2013

Suggested Citation

Orbach, Barak, Invisible Lawmaking (October 3, 2012). 79 University of Chicago Law Review 1 (2012); Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 12-32. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157079

Contact Information

Barak Orbach (Contact Author)
University of Arizona ( email )
1201 E. Speedway Blvd.
Tuscon, AZ 85721-0176
United States
520-626-7256 (Phone)
520.858.0025 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.orbach.org

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