Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157667
 


 



Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball


Garrett Broshuis


Saint Louis University - School of Law

April 5, 2012

57 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2012)

Abstract:     
Highly talented baseball players, as scarce commodities, command large sums of money in the form of signing bonuses prior to ever playing a professional baseball game. Yet the development of these highly talented baseball players is risky business. This Article demonstrates the utility of clawbacks in deterring possible opportunistic behavior amongst highly talented baseball players. Ultimately, the lessons learned from such deterrents can be applied to other areas ripe for opportunism such as executive compensation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Baseball, minor leagues, executive compensation, clawbacks, Dodd-Frank, opportunism

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 6, 2012 ; Last revised: March 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Broshuis, Garrett, Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball (April 5, 2012). 57 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2157667

Contact Information

Garrett Broshuis (Contact Author)
Saint Louis University - School of Law ( email )
100 N. Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63108
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 350
Downloads: 56
Download Rank: 228,357

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 2.203 seconds