Deterring Opportunism Through Clawbacks: Lessons for Executive Compensation from Minor League Baseball
Saint Louis University - School of Law
April 5, 2012
57 Saint Louis University Law Journal (2012)
Highly talented baseball players, as scarce commodities, command large sums of money in the form of signing bonuses prior to ever playing a professional baseball game. Yet the development of these highly talented baseball players is risky business. This Article demonstrates the utility of clawbacks in deterring possible opportunistic behavior amongst highly talented baseball players. Ultimately, the lessons learned from such deterrents can be applied to other areas ripe for opportunism such as executive compensation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: Baseball, minor leagues, executive compensation, clawbacks, Dodd-Frank, opportunismAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 6, 2012 ; Last revised: March 15, 2013
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