Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159119
 
 

References (51)



 
 

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Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence


Nuno Fernandes


IMD International

Miguel A. Ferreira


Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pedro P. Matos


University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kevin J. Murphy


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law

September 30, 2012

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that CEOs in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across 14 countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the US pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between US and non-US firms exposed to international and US capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that US and non-US CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: executive compensation, CEO pay, international pay differences, stock options, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: October 10, 2012 ; Last revised: November 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Fernandes, Nuno and Ferreira, Miguel A. and Matos, Pedro P. and Murphy, Kevin J., Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence (September 30, 2012). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2159119

Contact Information

Nuno Fernandes
IMD International ( email )
Ch. de Bellerive 23
P.O. Box 915
CH-1001 Lausanne
Switzerland
Miguel Almeida Ferreira (Contact Author)
Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Pedro P. Matos
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )
University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Kevin J. Murphy
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
BRI 308, MC 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
213-740-6553 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

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