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Rebels, Conformists, Contrarians And Momentum Traders


Evan Gatev


Simon Fraser University

Stephen A. Ross


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; Yale University - International Center for Finance

December 14, 2002

AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings; Yale SOM Working Paper No. ICF - 00-07

Abstract:     
We consider investing in a noisy market with incorrect beliefs about predictability. Two types of agents use subjective models to optimize their portfolios - "conformists" who happen to believe in the self-fulfilling market consensus and "rebels" who have wrong beliefs. We compare the agents' dynamic trading and their empirically observable investment performance. An agent who believes in log-normality is always a contrarian trader, who buys more shares after the price goes down, and sells shares when the price goes up. In contrast, an agent who believes in price predictability acts as a momentum trader, who buys more shares after the price goes up, for a range of subjective market mis-pricings. We show that more incorrect beliefs about predictability can lead to higher expected returns. Moreover, rebels with incorrect beliefs can have higher expected return than conformists with the same risk-aversion. We find that it is more dangerous to be a sophisticated rebel in a non-predictable world, than to be a simplistic rebel in a predictable world.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

JEL Classification: G11

working papers series


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Date posted: April 7, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Gatev, Evan and Ross, Stephen A., Rebels, Conformists, Contrarians And Momentum Traders (December 14, 2002). AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings; Yale SOM Working Paper No. ICF - 00-07. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=215952 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.215952

Contact Information

Evan Gatev (Contact Author)
Simon Fraser University ( email )
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
Stephen A. Ross
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-369
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
203-432-6015 (Phone)
203-432-8931 (Fax)
Yale University - International Center for Finance
Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
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