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Income-Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility


Michael Kremer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Center for Global Development

Daniel L. Chen


Duke University - School of Law

February 2000

NBER Working Paper No. w7530

Abstract:     
Developing countries with highly unequal income distributions, such as Brazil or South Africa, face an uphill battle in reducing inequality. Educated workers in these countries have a much lower birthrate than uneducated workers. Assuming children of educated workers are more likely to become educated, this tends to increase the proportion of unskilled workers, reducing their wages, and thus their opportunity cost of having children, creating a vicious cycle. A model incorporating this effect generates multiple steady-state levels of inequality, suggesting that in some circumstances, temporarily increasing access to educational opportunities could permanently reduce inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that the fertility differential between the educated and uneducated is greater in less equal countries, consistent with the model.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

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Date posted: April 18, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Kremer, Michael and Chen, Daniel L., Income-Distribution Dynamics with Endogenous Fertility (February 2000). NBER Working Paper No. w7530. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=216011

Contact Information

Michael Kremer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Rm. 207
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Center for Global Development
1800 Massachusetts Ave NW
Third Floor
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Daniel L. Chen
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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