Footnotes (4)



When Antitrust Met Facebook

Christopher S. Yoo

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication; University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science


George Mason Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 1147, 2012
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-31

Social networks are among the most dynamic forces on the Internet, increasingly displacing search engines as the primary way that end users find content and garnering headlines for their controversial stock offerings. In what may be considered a high-technology rite of passage, social networking companies are now facing monopolization claims under the antitrust laws. This Article evaluates the likely success of these claims, identifying considerations in network economics that may mitigate a finding or market power and evaluating whether a social network’s refusal to facilitate data portability can constitute exclusionary conduct. It also analyzes two early private antitrust law cases against social networking sites: LiveUniverse v. MySpace and Facebook v. Power Ventures. These analytical considerations and early case underscore the importance of requiring that antitrust claims be asserted in terms of a coherent economic theory backed by empirical evidence. Permitting looser assertions of anticompetitive conduct risks protecting competitors instead of competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: social media, Twitter, MySpace, network economic effects, market power, exclusionary conduct, gateways, adapters, data portability, privacy

JEL Classification: K21, L43, L81

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Date posted: October 11, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Yoo, Christopher S., When Antitrust Met Facebook (2012). George Mason Law Review, Vol. 19, p. 1147, 2012; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-31. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2160519

Contact Information

Christopher S. Yoo (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/
University of Pennsylvania - Annenberg School for Communication ( email )
3620 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6220
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)
University of Pennsylvania - School of Engineering and Applied Science ( email )
3330 Walnut St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6309
United States
(215) 746-8772 (Phone)
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