Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161372
 
 

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Market Power, Fully Revealing Prices and Welfare


Manuel Mueller-Frank


University of Navarra, IESE Business School

November 7, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper considers a dynamic duopoly market with strategic, price setting firms and an infinite set of fully rational, privately informed consumers who enter the market sequentially. I show that there exists a sequential equilibrium in which prices converge to their realized product qualities with probability one, hence perfectly aggregating the privately held information. This fully revealing equilibrium is shown to be welfare inferior to a fixed price equilibrium in which perfect information aggregation might fail. Therefore, one has to be careful not to equate fully revealing prices with welfare optimality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: Dynamic markets, market power, information aggregation, social learning, prices

JEL Classification: D21, D43, D60, D82, D83, D84

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Date posted: October 26, 2012 ; Last revised: November 7, 2012

Suggested Citation

Mueller-Frank, Manuel, Market Power, Fully Revealing Prices and Welfare (November 7, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161372 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2161372

Contact Information

Manuel Mueller-Frank (Contact Author)
University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )
Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain
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