Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163053
 


 



How the FTC Could Beat Google


Robert H. Lande


University of Baltimore - School of Law

Jonathan L. Rubin


affiliation not provided to SSRN

October 2012

CPI Antitrust Chronicle, October 2012 (1), pp. 2-3

Abstract:     
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission is rumored to be deciding whether to bring a “pure Section 5” case against Google as a result of complaints that the company unfairly favors its own offerings over those of its rivals in its search results. But the case will fail miserably at the hands of a reviewing court and the agency will be confined to relatively non-controversial enforcement violations if the FTC fails to impose upon itself a tightly bounded and constrained legal framework that contains clear limiting principles. The only way a court will allow the FTC to pursue a pure Section 5 theory against Google would be if the agency constrains itself with a coherent principle of competitive harm: the consumer choice framework.

This brief piece only summarizes the underlying issues. Readers interested in more information about the expansive use of Section 5 of the FTC Act should consult http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562727. Readers interested in more information about the Consumer Choice approach to competition and consumer protection law should consult http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121459.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 3

Keywords: Google, Federal Trade Commission, Section 5, unfair methods of competition, antitrust, FTC, search engines, consumer choice framework, consumer protection law

JEL Classification: K21, K29, K39, K49, L41, L49

working papers series





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Date posted: October 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H. and Rubin, Jonathan L., How the FTC Could Beat Google (October 2012). CPI Antitrust Chronicle, October 2012 (1), pp. 2-3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163053 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163053

Contact Information

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
Jonathan L. Rubin
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN


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