Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163594
 
 

References (37)



 
 

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Policy Design and Domestic Support for International Bailouts


Michael M. Bechtel


University of St.Gallen

Jens Hainmueller


Stanford University - Department of Political Science; Stanford Graduate School of Business

Yotam M. Margalit


Columbia University

April 2015


Abstract:     
Financial bailouts for ailing Eurozone countries face deep and widespread opposition among voters in donor countries, casting major doubts over the political feasibility of further assistance efforts. What is the nature of the opposition and under what conditions can governments obtain broader political support for funding such large-scale, international transfers? Addressing this question, we distinguish theoretically between 'fundamental' versus 'contingent' attitudes. Whereas the former entails complete rejection or embrace of a policy, contingent attitudes depend on the specific features of the policy and could shift if those features are altered. Combining unique data from an original survey in Germany, the largest donor country, together with a conjoint experiment that varies salient policy dimensions, our analysis indicates that only 23% of the public exhibits fundamental opposition to the bailouts. Testing a set of theories on contingent attitudes, we find particular sensitivity to burden-sharing features of the bailouts, spanning both the absolute and relative distribution of the costs. Our results imply that the choice of specific policy features has major implications for building domestic support for contributions to international assistance efforts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: bailouts, Eurozone, public opinion, conjoint analysis

JEL Classification: F5, P16, F34, D72


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Date posted: October 19, 2012 ; Last revised: April 14, 2015

Suggested Citation

Bechtel, Michael M. and Hainmueller, Jens and Margalit, Yotam M., Policy Design and Domestic Support for International Bailouts (April 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163594

Contact Information

Michael M. Bechtel
University of St.Gallen ( email )
Bodanstrasse 6
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.mbechtel.com
Jens Hainmueller (Contact Author)
Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )
Stanford, CA 94305
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.stanford.edu/~jhain/
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
Yotam M. Margalit
Columbia University ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
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