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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163606
 
 

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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information


Dirk Bergemann


Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

Stephen Morris


Princeton University - Department of Economics

September 26, 2012

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR

Abstract:     
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with quadratic payoffs and normally distributed uncertainty in terms of restrictions on the first and second moments of the equilibrium action-state distribution. We derive exact bounds on how prior knowledge about the private information refines the set of equilibrium predictions.

We consider information sharing among firms under demand uncertainty and find newly optimal information policies via the Bayes correlated equilibria. Finally, we reverse the perspective and investigate the identification problem under concerns for robustness to private information. The presence of private information leads to set rather than point identification of the structural parameters of the game.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 55

Keywords: Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D43, D83

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Date posted: October 18, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (September 26, 2012). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163606

Contact Information

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/
Stephen Edward Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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