Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164222
 
 

References (21)



 
 

Footnotes (27)



 


 



Are Joint Patents Collusive? Evidence from the US and Europe


Andrea Fosfuri


Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Christian Helmers


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Catherine Roux


University of St. Gallen

October 19, 2012

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-035
U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2013-15

Abstract:     
We investigate whether patents that are jointly held by legally independent companies help sustain product-market collusion. We use a simple model of repeated interactions to show that joint patents can serve collusive purposes. Our model generates two testable predictions: when joint patents are held for collusive purposes, a) there is a positive relationship between the propensity to jointly own a patent and proximity in the product market; b) joint patents are associated with less licensing in the market for technology than individually owned patents, especially when firms are close product-market competitors. We construct a large, novel dataset that contains information on patents, research joint ventures, and licensing at the firm-level for the US and the EU to validate our theoretical predictions. We exploit differences in the legal regimes applicable to joint patents in the US and Europe to show that the data is consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Joint patents, Property rights, R&D cooperation, Licensing

JEL Classification: K11, O31, O34

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Fosfuri, Andrea and Helmers, Christian and Roux, Catherine, Are Joint Patents Collusive? Evidence from the US and Europe (October 19, 2012). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-035; U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2013-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2164222

Contact Information

Andrea Fosfuri (Contact Author)
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )
Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain
Christian Helmers
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Catherine Roux
University of Saint Gallen ( email )
Varnbuelstr. 14
Saint Gallen, St. Gallen CH-9000
Switzerland
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,368
Downloads: 81
Download Rank: 178,524
References:  21
Footnotes:  27
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.313 seconds