Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=216469
 
 

References (34)



 
 

Citations (58)



 
 

Footnotes (8)



 


 



Voluntary Disclosure of Balance Sheet Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements


Shuping Chen


University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business

Mark L. DeFond


University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting

Chul W. Park


University of Hong Kong - School of Business

December 2001


Abstract:     
We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice ? managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future earnings are relatively more uncertain. Specifically, balance sheet disclosures are more likely among firms: (1) in high technology industries; (2) reporting losses; (3) with larger forecast errors; (4) engaging in mergers or acquisitions; (5) that are younger; and (6) with more volatile stock returns. This is consistent with managers disclosing balance sheets in response to investor demand for value relevant information to supplement earnings.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Capital markets, voluntary disclosure

JEL Classification: M41, D82, G12

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Date posted: June 10, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Chen, Shuping and DeFond, Mark L. and Park, Chul W., Voluntary Disclosure of Balance Sheet Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements (December 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=216469 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.216469

Contact Information

Shuping Chen
University of Texas at Austin - Red McCombs School of Business ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
521.471.5328 (Phone)
Mark DeFond (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting ( email )
Accounting Building, Room 206
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441
United States
213-740-5016 (Phone)
213-747-2815 (Fax)
Chul Won Park
University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )
Meng Wah Complex
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China
+852-2859-1081 (Phone)
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References:  34
Citations:  58
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