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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2165862
 
 

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Double-Edged Torts


Barbara Luppi


Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Daniel Pi


University of Bologna - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics; University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics

December 9, 2013

St. Thomas University School of Law Research Paper
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-57

Abstract:     
Traditional economic models of tort law assign determinate roles to parties, modeling their behavior as if parties knew in advance whether fate would cast them in the roles of “tortfeasors” or “victims.” However, for a large class of activities, individuals take precautions ignorant of whether they will be tortfeasors or victims, or indeed whether they will be involved in an accident at all. Further complicating the issue, there exists a category of precautions, which courts have not hitherto recognized, and which we call “hybrid precautions,” that reduce both the probability of being a tortfeasor and the probability of being a victim. In this paper, we extend the standard model to account for such cases of roleuncertainty and hybrid precaution, finding that incentives are not, as previously assumed, simply additive. We analyze and reassess the standard tort regimes under this new framework. From a policy perspective, we find that the traditional formulation of negligence fails to incentivize efficient care levels. We argue instead for a modification that does effect efficient precautionary efforts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: role-uncertainty, specialized care, hybrid care, Restatement (Third) of Torts (2005) Sec. 3

JEL Classification: K13, K32

working papers series


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Date posted: October 23, 2012 ; Last revised: December 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco and Pi, Daniel, Double-Edged Torts (December 9, 2013). St. Thomas University School of Law Research Paper; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-57. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2165862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2165862

Contact Information

Barbara Luppi
Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )
Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy
University of St. Thomas School of Law
MN
United States
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Daniel Pi
University of Bologna - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ( email )
Piazza Scaravilla 2
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics
Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
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References:  24
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