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Strategically Equivalent ContestsSubhasish M. ChowdhuryUniversity of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science Roman M. SheremetaChapman University October 23, 2012 Abstract: We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17 Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74 working papers seriesDate posted: October 24, 2012 ; Last revised: February 24, 2013Suggested CitationContact Information
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