Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166077
 
 

References (46)



 
 

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Strategically Equivalent Contests


Subhasish M. Chowdhury


University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science

Roman M. Sheremeta


Case Western Reserve University; Case Western Reserve University

October 23, 2012


Abstract:     
We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74

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Date posted: October 24, 2012 ; Last revised: February 24, 2013

Suggested Citation

Chowdhury, Subhasish M. and Sheremeta, Roman M., Strategically Equivalent Contests (October 23, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166077 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2166077

Contact Information

Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science ( email )
Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
Roman M. Sheremeta (Contact Author)
Case Western Reserve University ( email )
10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
Case Western Reserve University ( email )
Cleveland, CA 44106
United States
(216) 368-4271 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/romansheremeta/
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References:  46
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