Strategically Equivalent Contests
Subhasish M. Chowdhury
University of East Anglia - School of Economics, Center for Competition Policy, and Center for Experimental and Behavioral Social Science
Roman M. Sheremeta
October 23, 2012
We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design
JEL Classification: C72, D72, D74working papers series
Date posted: October 24, 2012 ; Last revised: February 24, 2013
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