Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166341
 
 

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Enforcement and the Concept of Law


Joshua Kleinfeld


Northwestern University - School of Law

November 22, 2011

121 Yale Law Journal Online 293 (2011)
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 12-39

Abstract:     
International law, many think, is not really law at all because it is not enforced. This Essay asks two philosophical questions about that claim. What do we mean by enforcement when we channel the intuition that enforcement is part of law’s nature? And what is the place of enforcement in our concept of law?

Enforcement, the Essay argues, is the activity by which a legally constituted power is applied to make the law’s dictates actual; it is a matter of law’s efficacy. Enforcement so conceived is constitutive of law’s identity as law, but not strictly necessary to it because law is not the kind of thing that has strictly necessary features. Nor is enforcement sufficient to make a norm a law: the skepticism toward international law is not based on enforcement alone.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Legal Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Enforcement, International Law, Jurisprudence

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Date posted: October 25, 2012 ; Last revised: December 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Kleinfeld, Joshua, Enforcement and the Concept of Law (November 22, 2011). 121 Yale Law Journal Online 293 (2011); Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 12-39. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166341

Contact Information

Joshua Kleinfeld (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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