Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases
John M. Connor
Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
June 20, 2011
Around the year 2000, the Antitrust Division announced a new policy that would substitute more frequent and more severe prison sentences for heavier corporate fines in criminal cartel cases. This article documents that the Division has indeed imprisoned more cartel managers and obtained longer sentences, but has failed to achieve other goals. The elimination of no-jail plea deals has not been realized; the number of imprisoned executives per firm has not risen appreciably; adoption of criminalization by other jurisdictions is glacial; almost half of those executive who go to trial are acquitted; extradition is rare and problematic; and the number of fugitives is growing. Identifying the optimal mix of corporate and individual sanctions for deterrence remains elusive.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: price fixing, cartel, antitrust, penalty, prison, criminalization
JEL Classification: L41, K21, K14working papers series
Date posted: October 24, 2012
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