Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement
Wouter P. J. Wils
King's College London – The Dickson Poon School of Law; European Commission
October 31, 2012
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2013, Forthcoming
Should companies that have antitrust compliance programmes be granted a reduction in the amount of fines or even immunity from fines when they are found to have committed antitrust infringements? Should the absence of a compliance programme constitute an aggravating factor leading to higher fines for antitrust infringements? Should the adoption of a compliance programme be imposed as part of infringement decisions or settlements? These are the questions which this paper examines, on the basis of an analysis of the nature of antitrust infringements, the rationale of company liability for antitrust infringements, and the possible positive and possible negative effects of compliance programmes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 35
Keywords: antitrust, compliance program, cartels, optimal enforcement, fines, settlement, corporate liability
JEL Classification: K00, K20, K21, K22, K42, L40Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 16, 2012
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