Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement

Wouter P. J. Wils

King's College London; European Commission

October 31, 2012

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2013, Forthcoming

Should companies that have antitrust compliance programmes be granted a reduction in the amount of fines or even immunity from fines when they are found to have committed antitrust infringements? Should the absence of a compliance programme constitute an aggravating factor leading to higher fines for antitrust infringements? Should the adoption of a compliance programme be imposed as part of infringement decisions or settlements? These are the questions which this paper examines, on the basis of an analysis of the nature of antitrust infringements, the rationale of company liability for antitrust infringements, and the possible positive and possible negative effects of compliance programmes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: antitrust, compliance program, cartels, optimal enforcement, fines, settlement, corporate liability

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K21, K22, K42, L40

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Date posted: November 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Wils, Wouter P. J., Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement (October 31, 2012). Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2013, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2176309

Contact Information

Wouter P. J. Wils (Contact Author)
King's College London
Somerset House East Wing
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

European Commission ( email )
Brussels, B-1049
Feedback to SSRN

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