Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177365
 


 



The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy


Michael Serota


Independent

Ethan J. Leib


Fordham University School of Law

November 17, 2012

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 5, 2013
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2177365

Abstract:     
The voting levers in candidate elections and in direct democracy elections are identical. The political obligations that bind the citizens that pull them are not. This Essay argues that voters in direct democracy elections, unlike their counterparts in candidate elections, serve as representatives of the people and are, accordingly, bound by the ethics of political representation. Upending the traditional dichotomy between representative and direct democracy, this Essay explains why citizens voting in direct democracy are representative legislators who must vote in the public interest and must not vote in their private interests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: direct democracy, public interest, candidate elections, voting ethics, political morality, representation

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Date posted: November 18, 2012 ; Last revised: June 5, 2013

Suggested Citation

Serota, Michael and Leib, Ethan J., The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy (November 17, 2012). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 97, No. 5, 2013; Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2177365. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2177365

Contact Information

Michael Eli Serota
Independent ( email )
Ethan J. Leib (Contact Author)
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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