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Speculative BetasHarrison G. HongPrinceton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) David Alexandre SraerPrinceton University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) November 2012 NBER Working Paper No. w18548 Abstract: We provide a model for why high beta assets are more prone to speculative overpricing than low beta ones. When investors disagree about the common factor of cash-flows, high beta assets are more sensitive to this macro-disagreement and experience a greater divergence-of-opinion about their payoffs. Short-sales constraints for some investors such as retail mutual funds result in high beta assets being over-priced. When aggregate disagreement is low, expected return increases with beta due to risk-sharing. But when it is large, expected return initially increases but then decreases with beta. High beta assets have greater shorting from unconstrained arbitrageurs and more share turnover. Using measures of disagreement about stock earnings and economic uncertainty, we verify these predictions. A calibration exercise yields reasonable parameter values. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 51 working papers seriesDate posted: November 20, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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