Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178700
 
 

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Strategic Information Sharing between Competing Retailers in a Supply Chain with Endogenous Wholesale Price


Noam Shamir


Tel-Aviv University

April 1, 2012

International Journal of Production Economics 136.2 (2012): 352-365

Abstract:     
This paper introduces a new motivation for information sharing in decentralized supply chains - as a mechanism to achieve truthful information sharing and to reduce signaling costs. We study a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer selling a homogeneous product to n price-setting competing retailers. Each retailer has access to private information about the potential market demand, and the retailers have an ex-ante incentive to share this information with each other and to conceal the information from the manufacturer. However, without a mechanism that induces the retailers to truthful information exchange as their strategic choice, no information can be exchanged via pure communication (cheap talk). To overcome this obstacle, two signaling games are analyzed: in the …first game, information is shared truthfully among the retailers; in the second game, information is also shared truthfully with the manufacturer. We show that under some conditions sharing information with the manufacturer results in a higher pro…t for the retailers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: supply chain management, supply chain coordination, information sharing, cheap-talk, signaling

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Date posted: November 21, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Shamir, Noam, Strategic Information Sharing between Competing Retailers in a Supply Chain with Endogenous Wholesale Price (April 1, 2012). International Journal of Production Economics 136.2 (2012): 352-365. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178700

Contact Information

Noam Shamir (Contact Author)
Tel-Aviv University ( email )
P.O. Box 39010
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
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References:  46
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