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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178725
 
 

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Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

November 20, 2012

University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 622

Abstract:     
Balance-of-powers arguments are ubiquitous in judicial opinions and academic articles that address separation-of-powers disputes over the president’s removal authority, power to disregard statutes, authority to conduct foreign wars, and much else. However, the concept of the balance of powers has never received a satisfactory theoretical treatment. This essay examines possible theories of the balance of powers and rejects them all as unworkable and normatively questionable. Judges and scholars should abandon the balance-of-powers metaphor and instead address directly whether bureaucratic innovation is likely to improve policy outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

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Date posted: November 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A., Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution (November 20, 2012). University of Chicago Institute for Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 622. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178725 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178725

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
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