Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Competition and Regulation Research Group; KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071
We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 18
Keywords: Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation
JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21
Date posted: November 23, 2012 ; Last revised: December 20, 2012
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