Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179037
 


 



Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations


Kai Hüschelrath


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Ulrich Laitenberger


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Competition and Regulation Research Group; KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation

Florian Smuda


Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

2012

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071

Abstract:     
We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21

working papers series


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Date posted: November 23, 2012 ; Last revised: December 20, 2012

Suggested Citation

Hüschelrath, Kai and Laitenberger, Ulrich and Smuda, Florian, Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179037

Contact Information

Kai Hüschelrath (Contact Author)
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
D-56179 Vallendar, 56179
Germany
Ulrich Laitenberger
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Competition and Regulation Research Group ( email )
L7,1
Mannheim, 68161
Germany
KU Leuven - Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy, and Innovation ( email )
Naamsestraat 69 bus 3500
Leuven, 3000
Belgium
Florian Smuda
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )
P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany
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