Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179491
 
 

References (28)



 
 

Footnotes (14)



 


 



Social Ties and IPO Outcomes


John Cooney Jr.


Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

Leonardo Madureira


Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management

Ajai K. Singh


Lehigh University - College of Business & Economics

Ke Yang


Lehigh University

May 6, 2015

Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We examine the role of social ties in IPO underwriting syndicate formation and find that an investment bank is more likely to be included in the underwriting syndicate when it is connected to the IPO firm through interpersonal social ties between the respective executives and directors. These social ties generate better outcomes, consistent with a quid pro quo arrangement between the respective parties. The investment bank benefits by receiving higher compensation, a more senior role in the IPO, and greater share allocations. For the IPO firm, the presence of social ties between the IPO issuer and the chosen underwriters is associated with net wealth gains for its pre-IPO shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: G24, G32

JEL Classification: Social Ties, IPOs, Investment Banking, Underwriters


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: November 23, 2012 ; Last revised: May 15, 2015

Suggested Citation

Cooney, John and Madureira, Leonardo and Singh, Ajai K. and Yang, Ke, Social Ties and IPO Outcomes (May 6, 2015). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2179491

Contact Information

John W. Cooney Jr.
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
806-834-1536 (Phone)
Leonardo Madureira (Contact Author)
Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management ( email )
364 PBL Building
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States
216-368-5003 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/madureira/
Ajai K. Singh
Lehigh University - College of Business & Economics ( email )
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
216-368-0802 (Phone)
216-368-6249 (Fax)
Ke Yang
Lehigh University ( email )
621 Taylor Street
Bethlehem, PA 18015
United States
6107583684 (Phone)
6107586429 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 797
Downloads: 136
Download Rank: 138,142
References:  28
Footnotes:  14
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.344 seconds