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Tuition Exchange

Umut Mert Dur

North Carolina State University

M. Utku Ünver

Boston College - Department of Economics

September 2013

We introduce a new matching model to mimic inter-college tuition exchange programs for dependents of faculty to attend other colleges tuition-free. Each participating college has to avoid being a net-exporter of students. Programs use decentralized markets making it difficult to achieve balance. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting colleges from exchange. We introduce two-sided top-trading-cycles (2S-TTC) mechanism that is balanced-efficient, student-strategy-proof, and respecting priority bylaws regarding dependent eligibility. Moreover, it encourages exchange, since full participation is dominant strategy for colleges. We prove 2S-TTC is the unique mechanism fulfilling these objectives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: Market Design, Matching Theory, Tuition Exchange, Balanced Exchange, Two-sided Matching, Two-sided Top Trading Cycles

JEL Classification: C71, C78, D71, D78

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Date posted: November 25, 2012 ; Last revised: November 21, 2013

Suggested Citation

Dur, Umut Mert and Ünver, M. Utku, Tuition Exchange (September 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2180357 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180357

Contact Information

Umut Mert Dur (Contact Author)
North Carolina State University ( email )
Raleigh, NC 27695
United States
Utku Unver
Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
+1 (617) 552 2217 (Phone)
+1 (617) 552 2318 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
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Download Rank: 191,200
References:  27
Footnotes:  35

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