Umut Mert Dur
North Carolina State University
M. Utku Ünver
Boston College - Department of Economics
We introduce a new matching model to mimic inter-college tuition exchange programs for dependents of faculty to attend other colleges tuition-free. Each participating college has to avoid being a net-exporter of students. Programs use decentralized markets making it difficult to achieve balance. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting colleges from exchange. We introduce two-sided top-trading-cycles (2S-TTC) mechanism that is balanced-efficient, student-strategy-proof, and respecting priority bylaws regarding dependent eligibility. Moreover, it encourages exchange, since full participation is dominant strategy for colleges. We prove 2S-TTC is the unique mechanism fulfilling these objectives.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 54
Keywords: Market Design, Matching Theory, Tuition Exchange, Balanced Exchange, Two-sided Matching, Two-sided Top Trading Cycles
JEL Classification: C71, C78, D71, D78
Date posted: November 25, 2012 ; Last revised: November 21, 2013
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.375 seconds