Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181850
 
 

References (22)



 
 

Citations (2)



 
 

Footnotes (11)



 


 



Airport Privatization and International Competition


Toshihiro Matsumura


University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science

Noriaki Matsushima


Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

December 2012

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 431-450, 2012

Abstract:     
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

JEL Classification: L33, L13, R48

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: November 28, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Matsumura, Toshihiro and Matsushima, Noriaki, Airport Privatization and International Competition (December 2012). Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 431-450, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181850 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00584.x

Contact Information

Toshihiro Matsumura (Contact Author)
University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science ( email )
Hongo 7-3-1
Tokyo, TOKYO 113-0033
Japan
Noriaki Matsushima
Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )
6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
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Abstract Views: 236
Downloads: 2
References:  22
Citations:  2
Footnotes:  11

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