Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182565
 


 



Cartels and Collusion - Empirical Evidence


Margaret C. Levenstein


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center; The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy

Valerie Y. Suslow


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

November 2012

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1182

Abstract:     
Chapter prepared for publication in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, editors. Cartels occur in a wide range of industries and engage in a wide range of behaviors in their efforts to increase profits. In this chapter, we discuss the wide variety of techniques that cartels use to increase prices and profits. Studies of national and international markets across the twentieth century find cartels in a wide variety of products and services, and these cartels typically last between five and eight years. The most important determinant of cartel breakup is effective antitrust policy. While it has often been presumed that cartels’ demise results from cheating by member firms tempted by short term profits, empirical analysis suggests that cheating rarely destroys cartels. The potential profits from collusion provide sufficient incentives for cartels to develop creative ways to limit the temptations that inevitably arise. While scholars and policy makers have often been concerned that business cycle downturns are associated with cartel formation, the evidence we review here does not suggest strong cyclical effects. There is evidence that cartels are formed during periods of falling prices, but these are more likely to be the result of market integration or an increase in competitive intensity than macroeconomic fluctuations. Similarly, cartel breakup does not evidence strong cyclicality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

Keywords: cartels, collusion, antitrust, competition

JEL Classification: L13, L16, L41

working papers series


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Date posted: November 30, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Levenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y., Cartels and Collusion - Empirical Evidence (November 2012). Ross School of Business Paper No. 1182. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182565 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182565

Contact Information

Margaret C. Levenstein (Contact Author)
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center ( email )
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-615-9088/6352 (Phone)
734-647-1186 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~maggiel
The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
Valerie Y. Suslow
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109-1234
United States
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