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The Sound Recording Performance Right at a Crossroads: Will Market Rates Prevail?


Jeffrey A. Eisenach


Navigant Economics LLC; George Mason University School of Law

December 3, 2012


Abstract:     
Starting in the 1990s, Federal policy has moved in the direction of a market-oriented approach towards sound recording rights, beginning with Congress’ decision to create a sound recording performance copyright in 1995. In 1998, Congress provided that most statutory royalty rates, including the rates paid by webcasters like Pandora Radio, would be set using a market-based “willing buyer, willing seller” (WBWS) standard. Since then, the WBWS standard has been applied in several rate setting proceedings, but complaints from webcasters that the rates were “too high” have led to Congressional intervention and, ultimately, to adoption of rates below market levels. Now, as a new rate setting cycle is about to get underway, webcasters have begun lobbying Congress to replace the WBWS standard with a new version of the so-called 801(b) standard, which promises copyright users a right of “non-disruption.” Adoption of the 801(b) standard – and the other changes favored by the webcasters – would result in rates below economically efficient levels, thereby distorting markets, slowing innovation and harming consumers. This paper examines the market for sound recording performance rights, concluding that Congress should resist webcasters’ pleas for regulatory favoritism and instead continue moving towards a market-oriented approach, starting with extending the sound performance right to terrestrial radio.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

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Date posted: December 4, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Eisenach, Jeffrey A., The Sound Recording Performance Right at a Crossroads: Will Market Rates Prevail? (December 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184487 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2184487

Contact Information

Jeffrey A. Eisenach (Contact Author)
Navigant Economics LLC ( email )
1200 19th St. NW
Suite 850
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-448-9029 (Phone)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
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