Does Target CEO Retention in Acquisitions Involving Private Equity Acquirers Harm Target Shareholders?
University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics
Frederik P. Schlingemann
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)
Chad J. Zutter
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group
Rene M. Stulz
Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
May 24, 2013
Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2012-03-026
Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2012-26
While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by a private equity acquirer can result in a lower premium for target shareholders because of the potential conflict of interest of the CEO, it is also possible that target shareholders could benefit from CEO retention because it can increase the performance of the acquired firm and, consequently, increase the premium that the private equity firm is willing to pay. Our evidence does not support the view that CEO retention harms shareholders in acquisitions involving private equity firms. In fact, we show that better performing target CEOs are more likely to be retained in acquisitions by private equity firms and that target shareholders gain an additional 7% to 23% of pre-acquisition firm value compared to when the CEO is not retained. Further, we find no evidence that the target’s value is artificially depressed ahead of a private equity acquisition where the CEO is retained.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49
Keywords: CEO retention, private equity acquisitions, mergers, acquisition premiums
JEL Classification: G30, G34working papers series
Date posted: December 6, 2012 ; Last revised: August 11, 2014
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